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The Department of Defense has mandated that all military programs implement 
integrated testing within their program whenever possible; however, the concern of 
information technology being agile steadily grows within the Department. The Chairman 
of the House Armed Service Committee appointed the Defense Acquisition Reform Panel 
on March 2009 to review the acquisition processes. The panel study claimed that the 
nature of defense acquisition has changed considerably over the years; however, the 
acquisition process has not been able to keep up with the changes. Moreover, the current 
position on how the DoD buys, adopts, creates, and implements testing of information 
technology has become an antiquated process. The DoD is looking for an agile process to 
rapidly develop and deploy information technology to the user while the technology is 
still relevant. The purpose of this research is to determine how much information 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to examine how much information technology (IT) 
testing is necessary prior to deploying information technology equipment to Department 
of Defense (DoD) users. The intent is to determine if a new acquisition process for 
information technology is suitable and feasible in reducing the current schedule required 
to provide new technology to the DoD warfighters.  This researcher reviews DoD 
information technology reforms, DoD House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 
reports, and the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act, along with other literature, in 
search of the best solution for the Department of Defense. In ascertaining which 
acquisition model might work best, the researcher explores the IT testing process and 
examines why the DoD is pursuing a new model for acquiring and testing IT.  The 
objectives of this research are threefold: assess whether it is feasible and in the best 
interests of the DoD to implement a new testing model for information technology; 
examine what an improved model should depict; and assess the associated risk of using 
an agile approach for testing IT.   
B. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense has mandated that all military programs implement 
integrated testing within their programs whenever possible. However, there is growing 
concern among acquisition professionals that information technology is more effectively 
developed using agile methodologies. According to Burton, Hammons, Lapham, 
Schenker, and Williams (2010), agile is defined as an iterative and incremental 
(evolutionary) approach to software development, which is performed in a highly 
collaborative manner by self-organizing teams (p. 5).  The Chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee appointed the Defense Acquisition Reform Panel in March 2009 to 
review the acquisition processes.  The panel study (Andrews et al., 2010) concluded that 
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acquisition process has not been able to keep up with these changes.  Moreover, the 
current acquisition process controlling how the DoD buys, adopts, creates, and 
implements testing on information technology has become an antiquated process.  The 
DoD is examining an agile process to rapidly develop and deploy information technology 
to users while the technology is still relevant. 
The impact of today’s economy and the use of federal funds have become reasons 
for Congress to question every acquisition program.  As stated in a Congressional 
Research Service report, the structure of the DoD acquisition system has been a concern 
of Congress for many years (Schwartz, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, program managers are 
faced not only with meeting the user requirements but also with budgetary restrictions. 
As the need for technology increases, how does the DoD provide technology to 
warfighters in a timely manner within the DoD’s current acquisition model?   
Information technology has revolutionized the way the DoD has conducted wars, 
deployments, and conflicts over the centuries. However, the acquisition system that the 
DoD is currently using for information technology is antiquated in providing the latest 
technology to warfighters. In the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 
cooperative report to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), it stated that 
“Congress, DoD and its industry partners have constructed a complex acquisition system 
designed first and foremost to promote fairness and prevent abuse” (Business Executives 
for National Security [BENS], 2008, p. 3). It further asserted that “unlike its commercial 
counterparts, which emphasize time-to-market and competition, the DoD system (in fact, 
all of Federal procurement) is process driven and encrusted with a statute and regulatory-
driven organizational structure that confuses oversight with management review” (BENS, 
2008, p. 3). 
The DoD finds itself still using one model for the entire acquisition of systems, 
which has proven that it slows the rate for new information technology development and 
deployment.  This does not mean that its current model has not provided quality systems 
from the acquisition process, but the timeliness of this process has impacted the 
warfighters capabilities during previous conflicts and wars. Deputy Defense Secretary 
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systems the world has ever seen, but in the IT area, “our system has followed that model, 
and it simply doesn’t work” (Garamone, 2010).  
The acquisition process has some key gates through which all systems must pass 
in order to be fielded to the intended users.  The process that these systems must undergo 
can be shortened based on the need, technical maturity, and type of equipment that users 
are requiring in a particular environment. In this report, the researcher analyzes the 
acquisition process briefly and examines the relationship between information technology 
and DoD testing. 
C. SCOPE 
This research has four objectives. The first is to assess whether it is feasible and in 
the best interest of the DoD to implement a new testing model.  Multiple acquisition 
models are available for tailoring the acquisition process to provide a more rapid 
response in developing the system or product and deploying it to the users. This 
researcher evaluates the current weapon system testing cycle against other information 
technology models that are proposed. On the basis of these models, this researcher 
analyzes those approaches along with how they might improve the information 
technology development process.  
Second, this researcher assesses the impact that the Business Capability Model 
has provided in developing business systems and deploying them to the warfighter. The 
Business Transformation Agency (BTA) has created this model in search of a faster 
approach to getting technology into the user’s hands. The researcher evaluates the 
possible courses of action for reducing the duration of information technology testing for 
Acquisition Category III IT systems by examining the Business Capability Lifecycle 
(BCL) model proposed by the BTA.  
Third, the researcher assesses historical testing data with regard to the number of 
defects discovered and how historical defect data can help determine how much testing is 
sufficient to reduce risks to acceptable levels. Because there is no way to eliminate all 
defects within software testing, the question remains of when to stop testing and deploy 
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efficiency and how it impacts future information systems testing.  The defects of a system 
under testing play a major factor in when a system is released to the users. Also, risk, cost 
and schedule dictate the release of a system. Currently, operational assessment provides 
programs with the ability to rapidly deploy an operationally effective system versus 
delaying the system deployment until it has completed the entire test program. 
Finally, the researcher closely examines the associated risk of using an agile 
approach to testing information technology. The intent is to determine and assess the 
implications of testing and deploying IT faster to DoD users.  The overall objective of 
this research is to answer the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
 On an ACAT III IT program, how much testing is required to ensure that 
risk is minimized to an acceptable level? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 How does previous software testing such as Government Validation and 
Verification (GV&V) Testing, Regression Testing, and System 
Acceptance Testing compare and impact the final decision to deploy a 
system to users? 
 How much additional testing is worth the cost and time for ACAT III 
programs? 
D.  RESEARCH METHOD  
The methodology used in this research included data collection from the Standard 
Procurement System (SPS) program office, which included test reports, SPS-Bugzilla 
reports, and customer service reports. Additional data came from the BTA acquisition 
process.  Data analysis was conducted to identify additional problems in order to 
understand the implication of how much testing is truly required for business systems 
within the Department of Defense.  As part of the data collection effort, the researcher 
also analyzed the different acquisition models that are currently used and the Defense 
Science Board–Information Technology (DSB–IT) proposed model in expediting the 
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E. CHAPTER OVERVIEWS 
The researcher explores the current acquisition process, system engineering 
process, and SPS data, along with GAO reports and other literature reviews, to determine 
how much information technology testing is sufficient to exit the testing phase. In 
Chapter I, the researcher introduced the reader to the purpose and scope of this research. 
The researcher also provided the foundation for the reader to understand the importance 
of this research. 
Background on the acquisition process begins in Chapter II, along with the testing 
aspect of the DoD.  The intent is to lay the foundation for the remaining chapters that 
move more into ACAT III IT systems and how the processes could improve to decrease 
the time and cost of all business systems.  In Chapter III, the researcher introduces the 
BTA along with its acquisition model and governance processes.  In this chapter, the 
researcher also introduces the data from the Standard Procurement System program and 
introduces how the analysis is conducted in Chapter IV. The intent of Chapter IV is to 
conduct an analysis of the data introduced in Chapter III. Finally, the researcher 
concludes Chapter V by answering the primary and secondary research questions, along 
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II. IT ACQUISITION AND TESTING BACKGROUND  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The DoD has been acquiring military information technology equipment for 
decades with the intent of maintaining information dominance over its enemies.  Like any 
corporation, the more market shares it has in the global world, the more powerful it is 
within that environment. The DoD acquisition process has provided that competitive edge 
for its warfighters throughout the advancement of technology.  However, as with any 
process, bottlenecks can occur. To understand how to resolve the problem, one most 
examine the current process and determine if there are no-value-added processes within 
the system.  The no-value-added process must be eliminated to reestablish a lean process 
that produces effective results.  
1. Current Acquisition Process 
The process of information technology acquisition is typically controlled through 
the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) from initiation (becoming a program of record) to 
eventual disposal (reaching the end of its lifecycle). The DAS management process also 
works parallel with other processes including the Joint Capability Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) system. Within any process, gates and gatekeepers maintain a certain 
portion of the management process.  These gatekeepers for the DAS are Milestone 
Decision Authorities (MDAs) that ensure everything is progressing according to the 
acquisition strategy plan.  The DAS governing document is the DoD 5000.01, The 
Defense Acquisition System (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2007), which provides the policies that govern the way the 
process is implemented.  Figure 1 is an excerpt from DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 
(USD[AT&L], 2008) and depicts the framework that drives the acquisition process. In 
Figure 1, the gates are milestones, and, within the gates, additional process owners such 
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embedded throughout the acquisition process.  These organizations impact the acquisition 
process timeline. As Hutchison (2009) wrote, “suffice it to say that in the course of 
creating the acquisition process, we have built a complex environment of rice bowls 
(meaning a person’s small part of a bigger process) and process ownership” (p. 16).    
 
 
Figure 1.   DoD Acquisition Management System 
(USD[AT&L], 2008, p. 12) 
 
2. Milestones 
The management of a complex system, whether it is a weapon or automated 
information system, can lead to a failure during the testing phases.  Within the acquisition 
system, there are three distinct phases that systems must go through in a serial process.  
The three phases are pre-system acquisition, system development and demonstration, and 
production and deployment, as depicted in Figure 1. During these three phases, numerous 
documents are produced.  Coordination of these documents must occur for programs to 
move forward in producing a product for DoD users.  Figure 1 depicts where the decision 
points are located throughout the milestones, along with the program initiation and how 
weapon systems, along with information systems, move throughout the acquisition 
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The key documents that are produced during these phases are an Acquisition 
Strategy, Test, and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP); Initial Capability Documents 
(ICDs); Capability Development Documents (CDDs); and a Capability Production 
Document (CPD).  Concept Decision; Milestones A, B, and C; Critical Design; and Full-
rate Production Decision Reviews are all key management events that are built within the 
acquisition process in order to produce a successful system. The milestones, put simply, 
are decision points that give program managers and decision-makers the ability to review 
acquisition programs, monitor and administer progress, identify problems and make 
corrections (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2005, p. 50).  This current process 
does not allow for fielding information technology systems to the warfighter in a timely 
manner. 
As stated within the DAU’s Defense Acquisition Guide (2005), the lifecycle 
process can be adjusted to fit a particular program, which is normally referred to as 
“tailoring.” (p. 50).  As the guidebook states: “The number of phases, key activities, and 
decision points are tailored by the program manager based on an objective assessment of 
the program’s technical maturity and risks, and the urgency of the mission need” (DAU, 
2005, p. 50). 
a. Milestone A 
The Milestone A decision point occurs during the pre-system acquisition 
phase. There are two phases within the pre-system acquisition phase that must occur prior 
to Milestone A: concept development and concept refinement.  During the concept 
development phase trade-off studies, the analysis of alternatives and the establishment of 
functional requirements form the Initial Capabilities Document. The concept refinement 
phase produces program manager’s charters, integrated product team’s charters, and 
technology development strategies. The concept refinement phase focuses on innovation, 
competition, and commercial off-the-shelf equipment. 
The technology development phase does not occur until after Milestone A.  
According to the DAU (2005), the purpose of this phase is to reduce the technology risk 
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integrated within the system.  This phase normally produces prototypes that are placed in 
a relevant environment to demonstrate their usefulness to the military.  The technology 
development phase leads into the next milestone. 
b. Milestone B 
After the Milestone B decision, the next phase in the serial process is the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. During this phase, various 
system engineering development, integration, and interoperability tests are conducted to 
develop the product.  The critical design review (CDR) is conducted during the EMD 
phase, and the system must demonstrate its usefulness to the military as one of the exiting 
criteria out of the EMD phase, which leads to the next milestone. 
c. Milestone C 
During this phase, operational tests and evaluations are conducted to 
ensure that the product and system production capability can satisfy the mission 
requirements.  The MDA has the option to either deny or approve a program for low-rate 
initial production (LRIP).  When a program is approved for LRIP, program managers 
work toward getting a full-rate production decision and producing sufficient systems for 
initial operational capability (IOC).  Typically, the production of LRIP systems is 
necessary to perform the critical Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) or 
Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) using “production representative” systems.   Too 
often, systems have entered into IOT&E or OPEVAL without significant operational-
type testing events earlier in the development.  The result has been that many systems 
have failed this critical test after production of the system has begun, and the DoD has 
taken note.  Testing communities are now required to conduct integrated testing when 
deemed necessary.  In order for a system to have a chance to succeed, operational testers 
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d. DoD 5000 Series 
The DoD 5000 series includes DoD Directive 5000.01 (USD[AT&L], 
2007), DoD Instruction 5000.02 (USD[AT&L], 2008), and other specific governing 
documents. DoD 5000.01 provides the directive that establishes the Defense Acquisition 
System. DoDI 5000.02 provides the instruction for implementing the DoD guidance.  The 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2009) provides additional guidance on best 
practices that should be tailored to acquisition programs.  These documents are the 
foundation of the DoD Acquisition Management System.  Automated Information 
Systems were included in the DoD 5000 series in the late 1990s.  This change brought the 
weapon system and the automated information system under the same set of rules. 
Although this made sense to DoD leaders during that time, Congress and acquisition 
leaders now perceive that a shift needs to occur to reduce the time to fielding for IT 
systems. The Defense Science Board–Information Technology (DSB–IT) 2009 
congressional reports, along with other reports, have pointed this out.  This is illustrated 
by the study conducted by the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense 
Acquisition Reform (DAR) that was established to review the acquisition process: 
As a result, the Department is unable to keep pace with the rate of IT 
innovation in the commercial market place, cannot fully capitalize on IT-
based opportunities, and seldom delivers IT-based capabilities rapidly. By 
way of example, the private sector is able to deliver capabilities and 
incrementally improve on those initial deliveries on a 12 to 18 month 
cycle; defense IT systems typically take 48-60 months to deliver. In an 
environment where technology is obsolete after 18 months, defense IT 
systems are typically two to three generations out of date by the time they 
are delivered. With the exception of IT purchased via vehicles like 
Enterprise Software Initiative contracts, COTS technologies are 
insufficiently leveraged, excessively tailored, inefficiently tested and 
delayed. (DSB–IT, 2009 p. 17) 
It is clear from the literature on the DoD 5000 series that other information 
technology issues are not fully defined within the roles of decision-makers nor in the 
process of dealing with information systems. Steve Hutchison, Test and Evaluation 
Executive for Defense Information System Agency, and George Axiotis, from the office 
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 Joint Staff J6, and the Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA), 
respectively, do not sign the T&E master plan (key process owners for 
interoperability and information assurance), even though they are principal 
customers of significant T&E activities (Hutchison, 2009, p. 16).  
 The MDA can make a decision to buy IT capability, and the DAA can 
deny the operation of that capability on the network (Hutchison, 2009, p. 
16). 
  “There is no way to establish a baseline on technology that is always 
changing” (Axiotis, 2009, p. 474). 
e. Acquisition Management Roles  
To fully understand the acquisition processes, the acquisition management 
role is reviewed in this section.  As mentioned previously, these managers play a crucial 
role throughout the acquisition process.  These managers are held responsible to control 
the cost, schedule, and performance of a product’s lifecycle from the conceptual phase 
through the disposal phase.  Even with this huge responsibility, a program manager is 
given no power in controlling different organizations that help determine the state of the 
program.  Every program is managed with these key elements: cost, schedule, and 
performance.  The acquisition managers must ensure that programs are meeting the 
requirements that are set forth in the acquisition strategy prior to transitioning to the next 
phase (Figure 1).   
Program managers, who are responsible for the overall development, 
production, and deployment of the system, are also responsible for ensuring that user 
requirements are met. In order to meet these requirements, program managers depend on 
contractors, the warfighters for the system, the DoD testing communities, and other 
supporting government agencies to provide support throughout the decision process and 
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f. Acquisition Categories 
The system’s acquisition category (ACAT) is based on the overall cost of 
the program or on how important the program is viewed by the decision-makers.  There 
are five distinct sections within the ACAT: major defense acquisition programs, major 
automated defense acquisition programs, major systems, and all other systems (except for 
the Army, Navy, and Marines Corps, which do not meet the ACAT I- III criteria).  These 
distinct sections are further subdivided into acquisition category numbers from I–IV.  To 
further explain the acquisition categories, Table 1 depicts the ACATs and explains why a 
program is under that category along with the MDA (DAU, 2005, p. 12). It is also 
important to note that the dollar value assigned to a program designates its category.  
Decision-makers can also raise the category of a program with a lesser value to maintain 
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Table 1.   Acquisition Categories 
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B. TEST COMMUNITIES OVERVIEW 
Five Operational Test Agencies (OTAs) operate within the DoD: Army Test & 
Evaluation Command (ATEC), Air Force Operational Test Command (AFOTEC), Navy 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR), Marine Corps Test and Evaluation 
Activity (MCOTEA), and Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC). The purpose of 
OTAs is to test and evaluate systems while employed in missions that are as realistic as 
possible in order for MDAs to assess whether a program should proceed within the 
process. OTAs are required by United States Code title 10 to conduct Initial Operational 
Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) on major defense programs.   
Title 10 law states that a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) may not 
proceed beyond an LRIP until an IOT&E is completed.  Testing is an integral component 
of the acquisition management framework, which determines if a system is performing 
sufficiently to move forward through the acquisition model.   Program Offices (PO) and 
the OTAs typically have some type of friction that creates problems during the testing 
process. The test community often tests something that was already tested by another 
testing agency, which causes redundant data collection efforts and also increases the 
testing time line. In its cooperative review 2008 report, the Business Executives for 
National Security (BENS) found that processes were adding to cost and time spent. 
The Developmental Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) and the 
Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) processes, while valuable and 
necessary, are at times excessive, non-standard across the services, and not 
particularly well-suited to evaluating software and IT applications, all of 
which adds to time spent on compliance and adding to cost. (2008, p. 3)  
George Axiotis’s article about establishing a new acquisition model states that 
“the DoD cannot wait for optimal solutions before fielding capabilities or rely solely on 
T&E as its gatekeeper” (2009, p. 478).  According to a report submitted to Timothy Harp, 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense Command, Control, Communication, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C3ISR) and IT Acquisition, that 
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new model that requires a combination of architected and agile approaches (Alvidrez et 
al., 2010, p. vii).  
The lingering question that is always addressed by the acquisition community is 
how much testing is enough. This question depends on whether the developers have the 
right requirements to design the system and on whether the testers have the right tools 
and test player to adequately test the system. The majority of the acquisition programs 
within the DoD are based on some form of software.  Testing software for the DoD 
comes in the form of vendor testing, developmental testing, interoperability testing and 
operational testing. This testing pattern is done in a serial fashion, and in most cases 
without conducting integrated testing.  As stated in Conley’s (2009) article, a test would 
be performed, data gathered, and then the system would move to the next test center. This 
process is time consuming, inefficient, and insufficient for network-enabled systems    (p. 
111). These test events produce test reports that are given to decision-makers to 
determine whether a program should proceed to the next phase of the acquisition process.  
There are several testing activities (i.e., funding requirements, establishing test 
units, developing test plans and conditions) that must be met prior to conducting DoD 
testing.  Those conditions come in the form of laws, regulations, and additional testing 
requirements.  DoD testing comes in the form of developmental testing and evaluation, 
operational testing and evaluation, interoperability testing and certification, and 
information certification and accreditation.  Table 2 depicts the roles and conditions 
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Table 2.   Test and Evaluation in the DoD Acquisition Process 
(Hutchison, 2009, p. 18) 
Activity  Test Agent Conditions Customer Reference 
DT&E PMO/contractor 





PMO DoD 5000 
OT&E Independent OTA 
“operational 

























OTA, DIA, FSO, 
NSA 
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1. Developmental Test and Evaluation  
Developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) is designed to help the program 
manager (PM) fix problems and identify issues early in the program, prior to going to an 
operational test.  During the developmental test, the PM can set the condition for the 
DT&E environment.  DT&E is the primary governmental T&E that verifies that the 
contractor has met the performance specifications detailed in the contract.  The PM 
typically looks more at the technical side of the system, meaning the functionality of the 
system, from a system engineering perspective. 
2. Operational Test and Evaluation 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) of systems is an independent test 
conducted by OTAs.  OT&E is designed to ensure that the system is operationally 
effective and operationally suitable considering the warfighter’s Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
factors.  The OTA has the responsibility of providing relevant feedback to the acquisition 
decision-makers, giving them information that will support the decision to field a 
particular system to the warfighter.  
3. Interoperability Testing 
Interoperability provides the testing required to ensure today’s program system 
can communicate flawlessly with emerging and legacy equipment.  JITC is the only OTA 
with the mandate and authority to certify DoD IT and National Security Systems (NSS) 
as meeting joint operation requirements (Herrin, Knodle, Mackenzie, & Stephens, 2008, 
p. 148).  
4. Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation 
All programs with joint interoperability requirements must go through the 
certification and accreditation process, along with the supportability and validation 
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involved early in the process in order to ensure that systems can get to the warfighters at 
a faster pace. When JITC and other certification processes are not embedded in the 
program, a system can get through the process, but it will not be able to operate within 
the network.  All certification occurs in labs as well as in a realistic environment. 
C. CURRENT TESTING TIME LINE 
The current testing time line within the DoD, particularly for IT systems, is 
impacted by the current weapon system model.  With the rapid pace of changing 
technology and evolving threats, the typical testing time line does not allow the DoD to 
move systems through the systems development process fast enough for the warfighter.  
The DSB–IT reported in March 2009 that a new model for information technology 
acquisition is required.  Figure 2 depicts the current testing time line, which can be 




Figure 2.   Test Execution Window 
(Hutchison, 2010, p. 25) 
Hutchison (2010, p. 24) wrote that his model allows considerably more than 
enough time to  reach a deployment decision review versus the actual time a program 
takes in the testing communities.  Testing factors such as acquisition leaders, cost, and 
resources play a major part in how long or short a program window can be within a T&E 
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This chapter provided background for understanding the acquisition process as 
well as the aspect of DoD testing.  The next chapter will introduce the BTA’s testing 
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III.  BUSINESS SYSTEMS  
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides information on the BTA business system, in particular, the 
Standard Procurement System, which is critical to the warfighters’ abilities to procure 
goods and services. Also, it presents data that will be later analyzed in Chapter IV to 
address the issues that were presented in Chapter I. 
The data represented in this section are provided from multiple sources: the 
System Procurement System (SPS) System Acceptance Tests, SPS Bug System reports 
(SPS-B), SPS Customer Service data, Congressional Research Service reports, GAO 
reports, and (BCL) data from the BTA.    
B. BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY 
The DoD sought to develop an agency to lead business transformation efforts 
throughout the DoD to improve the warfighter’s capabilities at a faster pace and to 
provide financial accountability to the taxpayers. The BTA was created in October 2005 
by the approval of the Defense Business System Management Committee (DBSMC).  
Although there are multiple directorates that makeup the BTA, the focus of this research 
is the Warfighter Requirements Directorate. 
The Warfighter Requirements Directorate (WR), originally known as the 
Warfighter Support Office (WSO), “addresses immediate business process and business 
system challenges that adversely impact current operations and connects the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD) business mission to the warfighter, identifying and addressing 
frontline opportunities” (www.bta.mil).  As stated by the BTA, the WR staff is structured 
to be lean, focused, and agile, with a tight focus on a small set of critical issues. This 
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C. BUSINESS CAPABILITY LIFECYCLE MODEL   
The Business Capability Lifecycle Model (BCL) was developed in 2007 under the 
direction of the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England.  The BCL 
provides a new acquisition management model for business systems with the goal of 
getting new capabilities out to the warfighters faster.  This model was years ahead of the 
model that the DSB proposed in March 2009 that addresses information systems.  The 
BTA noted that Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 08-020, “Investment Review Board 
(IRB) Roles and Responsibilities,” and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 
(CJCSIs) have been instrumental in implementing the BCL.  
1. DoD Investment Management Governance Evolution 
As depicted by the BTA BCL overview slide shown in Figure 3, DoD business 
systems fell under four different processes, all of which included purpose, governance 
structure, and documentation requirements.  These four processes were the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS); Planning Programming, 
Budget, and Execution (PPBE); the Defense Acquisition System (DAS); and the 
Investment Review Board (IRB)/Defense Business System Management Committee 
(DBSMC).  The DoD recognized in 2007 that in order for the BTA to perform its mission 
of pushing capabilities out to the warfighter faster and to be held accountable, it would 
need to merge all the processes except for PPBE, as depicted in Table 3, which is located 
in the Summary section of this chapter.  Figure 4 describes the BCL Governance as a 
governance model that applies the principles of tiered accountability by assigning 
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Figure 3.   DoD Investment Management Governance Evolution 











Figure 4.   BCL Governance 
(BTA, 2009, Slide 8) 
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2. BCL Management Model 
The BCL management model is an evolutionary approach to acquisition.  This 
model is made up of three phases: Business Capability Definition, Investment 
Management, and Execution.  The BCL is an increment-based time line that facilitates 
program development and implementation.   
The BCL functions are identified in Figure 5, which depicts the functions that 
occur in each phase of the model. The first phase begins with conducting an analysis and 
ends at Milestone A. The second phase starts with conducting solution analysis before 
moving to Milestone B.  The final phase begins with executing the program with a 
Milestone C decision on whether to continue or end the program.  The Enterprise Risk 
Assessment Methodology (ERAM) assessment is another tool that is utilized within the 
BCL; it is an independent assessment that can be conducted at any point within the 
lifecycle model.  ERAM assessments are generally conducted prior to any MAIS 
Milestone A and B decisions.  ERAM was noted as being no different from the DoD 
5000 process. A few of the goals of ERAM are to provide leaders with the ability to 
respond to emerging technology, make better decisions about how to manage program 
investments, and deliver business capabilities faster (Ketrick, 2009, p. 46).  
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D. STANDARD PROCUREMENT SYSTEM BACKGROUND   
The Standard Procurement System (SPS) was established in 1994 to eliminate 
numerous legacy systems that conducted contract management functions.  The system, 
over its lifecycle, has experienced some dark days with the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO).  GAO-02-392T stated,  
This “all or nothing” approach to investing in large system acquisitions, 
like SPS, has repeatedly proven to be ineffective across the federal 
government, resulting in huge sums being invested in systems that do not 
provide commensurate benefits. (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2002, p. 7) 
Furthermore, the system has received recognition as it matured within its 
lifecycle.  The Business Transformation Agency (2009) stated that the SPS program 
provides modern automation tools to the contracting community, which allows the 
procurement community to provide product and service to the warfighter on time and at 
reasonable prices. Currently, SPS is in the sustainment phase of its lifecycle.      
E. SOFTWARE TESTING   
Software testing has been a challenge for decades.  Understanding what to test 
and how much to test plays a role in the program and has implications on cost, schedule, 
and performance.  These are the fundamental issues that program or product managers 
face every day.  These items are measured in multiple ways; one such way is earned 
value management.  Earned value management is a technique for measuring the program 
status as 
 behind schedule and over budget,  
 ahead of schedule and over budget, 
 behind schedule and under budget, or 
 ahead of schedule and under budget.  
It is safe to say that all program and product managers would like to be in the 
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because they do not get the requirements right the first time (along with other variables).  
Hence, if the requirements are not correct, it could lead to a domino effect on the cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Cerpa and Verner (2009) cited some interesting data from 
the 2007 CHAOS report:  
In 2007, the Standish Group reported that 35% of software projects started 
in 2006 were successful compared with only 16% in the corresponding 
1994 report; however, the 2007 CHAOS report still identifies 46% (53% 
in 1994) of software projects as “challenged” (having cost or time 
overruns or not fully meeting user requirements) and 19% (31% in 1994) 
as outright failures. (p. 130) 
GAO-10-1059T stated that “according to DOD officials, the department relies on 
about 2,080 business systems, including accounting, acquisition, logistics, and personnel 
systems, to support its business functions” (GAO, 2010, p. 1). The report goes on further 
to mention prior work conducted by the GAO and Army Test and Evaluation, which 
found that delays in implementing certain Enterprise Resource Planning (ERPs) efforts 
within the DoD were due to inadequate requirements management, system testing, and 
data quality issues (GAO, 2010, pp. 18–19).   
There are multiple types of testing that are done for DoD business systems, such 
as black box testing, white box testing, unit testing, integration testing, incremental 
integration testing, functional testing, end-to-end testing, acceptance testing, and load 
testing, to name a few. Defining how much to test and when to stop testing in order to 
move forward typically depends on the resources that are available for that particular 
testing activity.  The data for analysis in Chapter III comes from the BTA program 
offices and the JITC system acceptance test report. 
F. SPS DATA METHODOLOGY  
In analyzing the SPS test report and SPS-B data, the researcher used data analysis 
techniques from Systematic Software Testing by Rick D. Craig and Stefan P. Jaskiel 
(2002).  Although there are multiple models or risk matrices that can address defect 
issues, there is not a one-fits-all model that can eliminate all bugs within a reasonable 
time to ship.  Boris Beizer, who is a software engineer and author and who is well known 
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rational criterion for stopping. Furthermore, given any set of applicable criteria, how each 
is weighted depends very much upon the product, the environment, the culture and the 
attitude to risk” (as cited in Craig & Jaskiel, 2002, p. 264).  
The analysis in this paper covers the measure of the test effectiveness in releasing 
a product for shipment. The data analysis will be derived from examining data from 
System Acceptance Test (SAT) and by also looking at Build 4, Build 5 Product, Build 5 
Government Validation and Verifications (GV&V), Build 5 Regression, and SATRC02 
data from the perspective of areas with the most product issues. The formulas used in this 
research are as follows: 
 Defect Removal Efficiency = Number of Bugs Found in Testing/Number of 
Bugs Found in Testing + Number Not Found; and 
 Defect Spoilage = (Sum of Number of Defects * Discovered Phase Age)/Total 
Number of Defects. 
The data analysis in this research also covers the usage of what-if scenario 
functions embedded within the Microsoft Excel program. This portion of the analysis 
reviews the data from different events occurring during particular phases within the given 
data.  
G. CUSTOMER SERVICE DATA 
Customer service data play an integral part in program success.  Help desk 
services are established in order to ensure that the customers are able to perform their 
daily missions. The two functions that are clearly seen from a help desk perspective are 
resolving customer issues and collecting data on system issues.  This analysis will not 
address SPS customer service from the perspective of whether it is a user issue or a 
software issue that was not addressed or caught during testing. The customer support data 
lack the historical data required to conduct a thorough analysis in this paper. Therefore, 
the data that is reviewed comes from Table 3, which displays a sample of the data that 
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H. SUMMARY   
This chapter provided some background information on the BTA and SPS 
program as well as described the data and techniques used in Chapter IV for data 
analysis.  There are copious amounts of data that date back to September 2005–2007, 
consisting of Increment 3 Build 5, Build 5 GV&V, Build 5 Regression Test, and SAT. 
Table 3.   Bugzilla Data 
(Program Manager, Standard Procurement System, 2010) 
 
 
bug_id creation_ts Version component final_score Resolution 
2226 16-Sep-05 Inc 3 Build 5 Deployment 3 DOCUMENTATION 
2227 17-Sep-05 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2   CLOSED 
2228 19-Sep-05 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2   CLOSED 
2229 19-Sep-05 Inc 3 Build 5 Deployment 2 PRODUCT_DEFECT 
2242 24-Oct-05 
Inc 3 Build 4 
Post PD2   DEFERRED 
2243 24-Oct-05 
Inc 3 Build 4 
Post PD2   DEFERRED 
2244 08-Nov-05 
Inc 3 Build 4 
Post PD2   DEFERRED 
2245 28-Nov-05 
Inc 3 Build 4 
Post PD2   DEFERRED 
2263 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2 2 PRODUCT_DEFECT 
2264 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2 2 PRODUCT_DEFECT 
2265 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2 1 DOCUMENTATION 
2266 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2   UNFUNDED_REQUIREMENT
2267 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2   CLOSED 
2268 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2   CLOSED 
2269 28-Feb-06 Inc 3 Build 5 PD2 3 PRODUCT_DEFECT 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. OVERVIEW 
With the use of Microsoft Excel, this chapter analyzes the 2,805 issues reported in 
the SPS-B database presented in the previous chapter.  Prior to discussing the Bugzilla 
data that are analyzed in this chapter, it is first necessary to explain the failure definitions 
and scoring criteria that are assigned to each issue placed in the SPS-B and the Data 
Authentication Group (DAG) process. Risk-based testing is introduced briefly in order to 
explain how effective it can be in testing software. Defect formulas are used to determine 
how many defects customers are potentially receiving after the release of the last 
software test. In the latter portion of this chapter, the researcher reviews the proposed IT 
models to see how they might decrease the time it takes to get technology to warfighters.   
B. BUGZILLA DAG PROCESS 
Prior to any issue being placed within the database (as stated in the SPS V4.2 
Increment 3 Build 5 System Acceptance Test Report; Program Manager, Standard 
Procurement System, 2007), it had to follow this process: 
Step 1: Issue discovered. 
Step 2: Issue replicated. 
Step 3: Issue put into SPS-Bugzilla.  
Step 4: Issue verified by Test Site Manager (TSM) and made “DAG Ready.” 
Step 5: Issue sent to DAG. 
Step 6: Issue scored at the Scoring Conference.   
1. DAG Members 
The DAG members consist of a designated Service representative, a vendor 
representative, and a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) subject-matter expert 
(SME).  The JPMO SME was tasked with validating and categorizing the issues. The data 
presented in this paper depict the DAG categories for scoring, which categories are 
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2. Issues Definitions 
 The issues scored during the DAG process were as follows: failed requirements, 
product defects, documentation, and training.  All other issues were not scored and were 
listed as follows: unfunded requirements, intermittent, duplicate, and closed. The 
following list was taken from the SPS System Acceptance Test Report (Program 
Manager, Standard Procurement System, 2007, p. 41) and describes how the issues were 
categorized:  
Failed Requirements 
An issue labeled failed requirement meant that the issue was determined to have failed a 




An issue labeled product defect meant that the software was not working properly, but it 
did not have a contractual requirement that specifically failed. 
 
Intermittent Issues 
If an issue was found more than once but could never be reliably and consistently 
replicated, it was labeled intermittent. 
 
Training Issues 
If an issue could be remedied by providing a solution in training materials, the disposition 
was labeled training. 
 
Documentation Issues 
If the issue was determined to be fixable by a script or operational scenario edit, the 
disposition was labeled documentation.  If the vendor-delivered instructions (e.g., the 
installation guide or online help) required editing, the issue was similarly dispositioned 
documentation.  The issue was not closed. 
 
Unfunded Requirements 
If the software currently had no contractual requirement to perform an action that 




Issues that were working as designed, that could not be replicated, or that were tester 
errors were labeled closed.  In some cases, duplicate issues (e.g., issues already reported 
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Duplicate Issues 
When an issue was agreed upon by all members of the DAG to be a duplicate of another 
issue being tracked, it was dispositioned duplicate issue. 
 
3. Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria 
The failure definition and scoring criteria for the SPS-B data that is analyzed in 
this chapter originated from the SPS Test report.  The scores are listed from one through 
five, with one being mission critical and five being not critical. Table 4 describes the 
priority the issue was assigned if it met a certain criteria.  The lower the numeric value 
assigned to the issue, the higher the risk associated with the issue. 
Table 4.   Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria 

















Applies if problem could … 
1 a. Prevent the accomplishment of an essential capability. 
b. Jeopardize safety, security, or other requirement designated critical. 
Example: Cannot create or process core procurement documents. 
2 a. Adversely affect the accomplishment of an essential capability, and no 
work-around solution is known. 
b. Adversely affect technical, cost, or schedule risks to the project or in 
lifecycle support of the system, and no work-around solution is known. 
Example: Cannot create attachments or supporting documents. 
3 a. Adversely affect the accomplishment of an essential capability, but a 
work-around solution is known. 
b. Adversely affect technical, cost, or schedule risks to the project or to 
lifecycle support of the system, but a work-around solution is known. 
Example: Data expected to pre-fill using copy functions does not auto 
populate, but user can manually enter data. 
4 a. Result in user/operator inconvenience or annoyance, but does not 
affect a required operational or mission-essential capability. 
b. Result in inconvenience or annoyance for development or personnel, 
but does not prevent the accomplishment of the responsibilities of those 
personnel 
Example: Cannot populate a field via Favorites functionality but can use 
alternate-designed methods to populate. 
5 Any other effect. 
Example: Misspellings that are not critical to the understanding of data 
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C. RISK-BASED TESTING 
There are numerous software models that depict how to determine the amount of 
testing required before issuing software to users.  Testing for bugs is an exhaustive 
process. Bugs will always be within any product. However, identifying and fixing these 
bugs by prioritizing them can be beneficial to the program office.  Interaction between 
the designer, the tester, and the user is invaluable throughout this process, which will 
determine the outcome of the software.   Figuring out how much to test and when to stop 
testing can be determined by creating a baseline for similar projects to follow.  However, 
every model is only as good as the information embedded within it. 
1. Defect Prediction Model 
The defect prediction model is a simple tool that enables the developers, 
engineering teams, and testers to discover how many defects will be released to the user.  
Figure 6 can help in determining where the focus should be throughout the testing phases. 
This model describes the flow of defects throughout the testing phases, along with the 
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Figure 6.   Defect Prediction Model 
The SPS-B data is depicted within Figure 7, demonstrating the volume of defects 
moving from test phases to the customer.  This figure also depicts a 28% defect-removal 
efficiency rate after the last test is conducted.  This data portrays all the SPS-B data that 
are not labeled closed. 
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The Standard Procurement System went through five testing events during which 
the SPS-B collected the issues.  The data was populated within the SPS-B database 
covering the components that were tested.  The components that were analyzed with the 
defect prediction model are the PD2, Technical, and Legacy components of the SPS.  
This time, the data was run from the perspective of defects that the customers will receive 
after the last test.  The defects fell into the categories of training, documentation, product 
defects, and failed requirements. Table 5 depicts the total defects found in each 
component during the different testing phases, and Table 6 depicts the number of defects 
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Inc 3 Build 5 299 Not tested Not Tested
GVV 310 52 66
Regression 51 6 38
SAT 33 51 19
SATRC02 4 12 0  
Note. The numbers in this graph were calculated from the SPS-B Excel file. 
Table 6.   Final DAG Scoring Numbers 
1 2 3 4 5
Inc 3 Build 5 23 196 59 19 2
GVV 112 346 136 34 0
Regression 9 45 30 11 0
SAT 13 48 37 5 0
SATRC02 0 7 6 3 0
Final Scores
 
Note. The numbers in this graph were calculated from the SPS-B Excel file. 
The SPS-B data indicate, for the most part, a steady decline in defects from the 
beginning of the test event to the last test event, as depicted in Table 5.  Table 6 also 
shows a decreasing trend on the critical aspect of the defect as it moves from one phase 
of testing to the next.  The data that is not depicted is the data indicating where each 
component falls in the categories of failed requirement, product defect, documentation, 
and training.  A majority of the critical defects fell under PD2 and Legacy. The PD2 and 
Legacy defects were mostly found under failed requirements and product defects.  
Another view, from a tester perspective, is how the number of defects can be reduced 
from the vendor testing to GV&V. By understanding the testing requirement and user 
requirement, the elapsed time for discovering additional defects during GV&V can be 
reduced by actively engaging the Vendor testing procedures. 
D. SOFTWARE TEST COST   
Software testing is extremely costly to programs and can affect the program 
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from users or misunderstandings from an engineer can be devastating to a program that is 
already over cost.  The formula used in this research analysis considers the overall defect 
cost.  Software defect cost can be described simply by using the following formula: 
Software Defect Cost = Industry Salary Standards * (Number of Defects * 
Number of Hours Required to Fix the Defect).   
This formula provides an estimate on the additional cost the program will incur 
with defects.  Typically, if defects are caught early, the cost will be low.  However, when 
defects are caught after the release of the software, the cost will be notably higher than 
fixing the problems early in the testing phases.  This analysis used the estimated salary of 
software engineers, developers, and programmers with nine years of experience and a 
$43.99 hourly pay from http://www.payscale.com. This analysis also assumed three 
software engineers working 10-hour periods each to fix one bug/defect. An analysis of 
the 1,844 defects from Figure 7 that are passed on to the customer for a quick release of 
the product will cost $811,175.60 to fix. This number represents labor only and would 
vary considerably depending on the type of contract used. 
E. LIFECYCLE MODEL FOR IT SYSTEMS    
The Business Capability Lifecycle Model (BCL) represents an approach to 
pushing equipment out to the user within 12–18 months, but faster than 24 months.  The 
DSB–IT model shown in Figure 8 depicts an approach to reduce the time of pushing 
information systems out to the user with similar time frames as the BCL model.  Figure 9 
shows that the model Hutchison discussed is where a certain capability is built, and then 
that capability is tested and sent out to the user community.  This same model depicts an 
incremental approach after the release of the first increment. All of these models have the 
same intended goal of 18 months of procuring, testing, and deploying the product to the 
warfighter.  Systems that are tested in smaller capability increments and that are fielded 
earlier with planned follow-on capability upgrades provide more benefits than systems 
that are fielded after the technology has become antiquated. This method of building a 
little, testing a little, and sending the technology out to the warfighter is becoming a 
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Research Council (NRC) have recognized this for years. “In 2006, the National Research 
Council observed that DoD is fast approaching a period in which a single all 
encompassing large-scale operational test, as currently practiced, will cease to be 
feasible” (Hutchison, 2010, p. 23). 
 
Figure 8.   DSB–IT Proposed IT Acquisition Process 
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Figure 9.   Agile T&E Model 
(Hutchison, 2010, p. 27) 
The NRC provided a 2009 study to the DISA on how to achieve effective 
acquisition of technology for the DoD.  The NRC stated, “The discrepancy between DoD 
fielding cycles and COTS life cycles is stark, and measured in years” (National 
Academies Press, 2010, p. 5). They went on to add the following:    
 The oversight process focuses too much on shortcomings of COTS 
products and services and inhibits the timely delivery of meaningful 
(albeit imperfect) end-user capabilities. 
 IT program requirements are often written with overly detailed 
specifications, take a long time to develop, and are not consistent with the 
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 DoD acquisition, budgeting, requirements processes, which are designed 
for large weapons systems acquisition programs, are being inappropriately 
applied to relatively low-dollar IT programs. 
 Dollar thresholds are used to assign the level of oversight for IT programs. 
These levels are significantly lower than the dollar levels used for 
determining oversight levels for weapon system programs.  This disparity 
subjects too many IT programs to time-consuming, high-level DoD 
oversight and prevents the delegation of oversight to lower levels that are 
more agile. 
 The DoD’s acquisition training curriculum does not adequately address 
the special challenges of IT system acquisition or prepare program 
managers to run IT programs effectively.  This shortfall impedes the 
DoD’s ability to assess, adapt, and adopt applicable commercial methods, 
processes, products and services. (National Academies Press, 2010, p. 5) 
Information technology can be unique and very complex; however, those risks, as 
they pertain to cost, schedule, and performance, can be reduced by using multiple 
matrices. Matrices that are non-complex in nature and that are easy to update can benefit 
an organization if used correctly.   A defect matrix can be one of those multiple matrices 
that narrows the focus on where the risk is located and on how much additional effort is 
required to appropriately address that risk.   
Each of these models represents processes that create time delays due to 
regulatory requirements before passing through one acquisition phase to another.  In 
order to have an agile process that pushes capabilities out faster, the DoD requires 
methods that reduce the number of requirements while ensuring systems are meeting the 
following criteria: suitable, effective, interoperable, and secure for the warfighters. In an 
article by Cloutier and Crowe (2009) about fielding capabilities while using an agile 
process, they stated, “Our Agile and flexible approach to systems and software 
engineering allowed us to capture the true essence of rapid prototyping and capability 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
On an ACAT III IT program, how much testing is required to ensure that risk is 
minimized to an acceptable level? 
In determining how much testing is enough for the ACAT III IT system, the 
author had to determine the underlying causes that bring this question up for discussion.  
As noted throughout this research, the underlying cause of information technology being 
delayed to the warfighter is the way in which the DoD is currently controlling the 
development of IT systems.  Although studies have concluded that there is a need to 
establish new information technology processes, systems will continue to be delayed to 
users under the existing DAS model.  The rationale behind this is simple: changing the 
weapons system acquisition process will take more than creating a new process to follow. 
It will take leaders implementing these new changes with a JCIDS process that is more 
balanced in order to support information technology systems that are not large weapon 
systems.  GAO-08-1060 reported that the JCIDS process had proven to be lengthy, 
“taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need—which further undermines efforts 
to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near-term” 
(GAO, 2008). 
The risk-based testing approach, which was discussed in Chapter IV, can 
minimize risk throughout the entire testing process if done correctly.  In order to reduce 
the testing time, organizations must understand the user requirements as well as the 
testing requirements of each organization. It is important that during each testing phase, 
the test community identifies critical issues and focus areas for the next phase of testing. 
The key to decreasing time in testing is linking the test designs back to the customer 
requirements.  Understanding the testing scope within each organization and how 
integrating testing can improve the overall testing of the system will benefit all the 
stakeholders involved.  The program manager, users, and testers working as an integrated 
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back to the critical areas that must be addressed for a successful system.  This way, 
testing is reduced and minimized at an acceptable level.  Therefore, on an ACAT III IT 
system, the amount of testing that is required to ensure that risk is minimized to an 
acceptable level is dependent on how effectively the system testing is managed.  
There are numerous reasons why software systems fail to be delivered to users on 
time. Those reasons come in the form of the IT delivery date impacting the developer’s 
process, actual project cost and time being underestimated, risks not being re-assessed or 
controlled throughout the process, and changes to software configurations being 
inadequately controlled throughout the lifecycle. Understanding the critical role of defect 
management and adequately reporting those risks and changes, along with validating 
those defects that are actually resolved will reduce the testing time line.    
Improvement of the software process during testing can greatly help the program 
office in achieving a quality product prior to user acceptance.  Simple, noncomplex 
matrices that identify bug issues and where the issues are within the product can be more 
beneficial then explaining a complex chart.  Bug-capturing matrices and the early 
identification of issues can greatly decrease the time and cost of entering a product into 
its final testing phase. The impacts of using defect-removal activities have benefits that 
can help similar programs to determine what to emphasize during testing. This could also 
help them to meet testing objectives.  Testing software is not effective if those doing the 
testing do not know what to test or how much to test.   
B. SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS 
 How does previous software testing such as GV&V testing, regression testing, 
and system acceptance testing compare and impact the final decision to deploy a system 
to users? 
Software testing through all phases can negatively impact the next phase if 
rigorous testing is not conducted.  As noted in Chapter IV, SPS testers and users are 
invaluable in the testing process. Testers and users must be integrated with software 
engineers during testing to ensure the system is actually working as intended in an 
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bugs being handed over to the users, the component defects decreased throughout the 
components’ testing phases.   
Previous software testing can establish a baseline for future system testing.  By 
understanding where the most critical issues occurred in previous testing, testers can 
identify and mitigate defects in future testing. Critical defects will typically decrease as 
more testing is conducted; however, as depicted in Table 6 in Chapter IV, DAG critical 
issues tend to increase in GV&V and SAT.  This increase in DAG critical issues may 
have occurred due to testing scenarios that were never presented in previous testing 
phases nor known to be a requirement from a developer/tester standpoint.  Users’ 
involvement can potentially reduce defects if the user community knows exactly what 
they need and can articulate those requirements to the acquisition community.  
How much additional testing is worth the cost and time for ACAT III programs? 
One way of reducing additional testing is by incorporating integrated testing with 
an understanding of the output from the event.  DiPetto (2009) discussed integrating 
testing as a way of improving the quality of the information provided to decision 
authorities (p. 332).  He went on to say, “The challenge to T&E community is to 
implement robust integrated testing and change the culture to fully realize the benefits to 
the acquisition process and ultimately to the warfighter” (DiPetto, 2009, p. 332). Testing 
for business systems must still go through proper testing events (i.e., information 
assurance, functional, interoperability, performance, and operational acceptance testing) 
to ensure that the intended system can functionally operate and that it is suitable for the 
warfighters.  However, incorporating other testing agencies and the users can reduce the 
testing time line if requirements are understood earlier and tested throughout the testing 
cycle.  Although most ACAT III systems are not categorized as life-threatening systems, 
the degree of testing lies with the test community and the program office on the scope of 
the test requirements. The decision of whether to continue to test must take into account 
the risk of conducting more tests (meaning, is it feasible to continue testing a system that 
has reduced all critical defects).  In order to understand how much additional testing is 
actually worth the additional cost and time, the test community will need to understand 
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accurately test the system for capabilities that are required now.  By taking this approach 
in building a little and testing a little, users will get exactly what they need versus waiting 
for a capability that is antiquated.   
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
This researcher’s recommendation for further studies includes conducting actual 
surveys and interviews with users, testers, evaluators, and program office personnel to 
determine how much testing is really required from the standpoint of the community. It 
would also be valuable to review the testing processes of program offices and the JITC to 
determine if they have the resources necessary for testing and capturing defects.  This 
author believes that capturing the testing processes of an organization can determine how 
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